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A. Introduction
1 In March 2018, 44 of the 55 African States → African Union (AU) [MPEPIL] members met in Kigali,
Rwanda to sign a landmark pact that aims to transform intra-African trade relations (Viljoen, 2011).
In May 2019, that pact, the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area
(‘AfCFTA’; ‘Agreement’), entered into force. The initial implementation was projected to commence
in mid-2020; however that plan was temporarily derailed by the coronavirus pandemic and rescheduled
for 2021 (African Union, 2021). Trading under the AfCFTA was officially launched on January 1,
2021. If fully realized the AfCFTA will cover 54 countries (the largest of any regional trade bloc),
creating a market encompassing over 1.2 billion people (Luke, 2019). There are currently 54 signatories
and 34 countries have undertaken their domestic requirements for the ratification of the Agreement.
Through the AfCFTA, the AU seeks to create a pan-African free trade area liberalizing the flow of
goods and services, thereby increasing intra-African trade and enhancing regional development
prospects. Ultimately, the AfCFTA is an important stepping-stone toward the actualization of the
African Economic Community (‘AEC’).
2 There is much still to be done and realizing the ambitions of the AfCFTA will not be easy, as
experiences with regional trade pacts on the continent have shown (de Melo, 15, 2013; Geda and Taye,
359, 2008). AfCFTA is a phased project that is designed to evolve (Art 7 AfCFTA). The Phase 1
agreement includes protocols on goods, services and dispute settlement, as well as several annexes.
The annexes govern matters such as customs and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary
standards, nontariff and technical barriers to trade and trade remedies. Article 23 of the Agreement
brought the Phase 1 instruments into force with the Agreement. Phase II, which includes protocols
on investment, intellectual property, and competition, remains the subject of negotiation (IISD, 2019).
3 Article 20 AfCFTA establishes a Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the Protocol on Rules and
Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes (‘the AfCFTA DSM Protocol’; ‘Protocol’) and a Dispute
Settlement Body (‘DSB’) for resolving disputes between State Parties. The AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism is a central element of the AfCFTA as it provides security and predictability to the regional
trading system (Art 4 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). The AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism will
‘preserve the rights and obligations of State Parties under the Agreement and clarify the existing
provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’ (Art 4(1) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Accordingly, the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism has the potential to enhance the integrity and efficiency of the whole AfCFTA trading
system.
4 This entry focuses on the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism. In the ensuing sections, this
submission reflects on that mechanism from a historical, procedural, comparative, and critical
perspective. Where necessary, it highlights areas of improvement that may better position the dispute
settlement mechanism to facilitate the objectives of the AfCFTA.
B. Historical and Political Context of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African
Continental Free Trade Area
5 The AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism was born into a complex regime of regional trade
agreements and dispute settlement regimes. The quest for economic integration in Africa has been in
the pipeline since the 1960s (Cheluget and Wright, 2017, 482-483). One of the founding purposes of
2
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the defunct Organisation of African Unity (Organisation of African Unity Charter, 1963, ‘OAU
Charter’), was to ‘coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples of Africa’ (Art II(1)(b) OAU Charter). To this end, the OAU Member States sought to
coordinate and harmonize their respective domestic economic policies (Art II(2) OAU Charter).
Member States pledged to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, accordingly,
established a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Art XIX OAU Charter;
Maluwa, 1989, 301). The OAU Protocol of this Commission laid an elaborate framework for the
resolution of disputes between States. The Protocol did not precisely earmark the substantive
jurisdiction of what may be termed the OAU dispute settlement mechanism. Rather, the language of
the Protocol was sufficiently open-ended to elicit the inference that the OAU dispute settlement
mechanism could be used to resolve any form of dispute, including those bordering on trade relations
between Member States. Crucially, the absence of an instrument setting out the substantive rights and
obligations of States in matters of trade made it impracticable for members to utilize the mechanism
to resolve trade disputes. Its limitations notwithstanding, the OAU Protocol occupies a historical
position as a continent-wide dispute settlement system in Africa, and, in that respect, can be regarded
as a precursor to the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism.
6 In the late 1970s, the OAU reiterated its drive for intra-African economic integration with the launch
of the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa, built on collective self-reliance to
form an African common market (1980-2000) (D’Sa, 1983, 13). These efforts were amplified in 1991
when African heads of state signed the Treaty Establishing the AEC. It contained an ambitious sixstage roadmap to full economic integration, including the establishment of a customs union, a single
market and an economic and monetary union (Fasan, 2019). Article 18 of the AEC Treaty established
a Court of Justice of the Community (‘AEC Court’), whose responsibility was to ensure adherence to
law in the interpretation and application of the treaty. Article 87 further specified that any dispute
regarding the interpretation of the treaty should be amicably settled through direct agreement by the
parties to the dispute; and if the parties failed to settle such dispute, either party could refer the matter
to the Court of Justice for a final decision. The AEC Court was never established as the AEC process
is still unfolding (Naldi and Magliveras, 1999, 610-615). Suffice to note that today, the AfCFTA
Agreement is envisioned as an important step towards the achievement of an African economic
community.
7 In 2002, the African Union (‘AU’) replaced the OAU as the continent’s principal intergovernmental
establishment. The objectives of the AU were both political and economic (Art 3 AU Constitutive
Act). Article 18 of the AU Constitutive Act established a Court of Justice. Article 19 of the AU
Protocol of the Court of Justice vests broad jurisdiction on the court over the interpretation,
application or validity of Union treaties and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the
framework of the Union. While it seems that the African Court of Justice was positioned to perform
– and even go beyond – the functions hitherto reserved for the AEC Court (Oppong, 2010, 99), the
African Court of Justice has also not yet been established.
8 The vacuum created by the continued absence of an active continental trade agreement with a
vibrant dispute settlement regime has been filled significantly at the regional levels. Despite the fact
that the majority of the regional economic communities have an adversarial European Union courtsstyled regime (Alter, 2014, 3-8), most of the disputes adjudicated before the regional courts have been
non-trade (Gathii, 2020, 7; Akinkugbe, 2020b). Trade relations between African States have been
fostered largely at the regional level with a reliance on the → World Trade Organization (WTO)
[MPEPIL] (Stoll, 2014) dispute settlement regime (‘WTO dispute settlement mechanism’).
3
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9 Despite the poor record of African States in utilizing formal dispute settlement regimes, the AfCFTA
dispute settlement mechanism is modelled on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In this form
of transplantation, the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism follows the Tripartite Free Trade Area
(‘TFTA’), a free trade area between three regional economic communities: Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (‘COMESA’), Southern African Development Community (‘SADC’),
and the East African Community (Parshotam, 2019). The TFTA Agreement established a dispute
settlement mechanism that is similar in structure and function to the present AfCFTA dispute
settlement mechanism (Art 30 TFTA Agreement). The TFTA dispute settlement mechanism is
projected to become operational in 2020 (Kambafwile, 2020).
10 Independent African States have joined the WTO system in large numbers since the 1960s
(apartheid South Africa and Zimbabwe both joined the GATT in 1948). Of the 164 members of the
WTO, no fewer than 43 are African States. In addition, nine African States enjoy observer status. As
already noted, African States are infrequent users of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and have
been reluctant to litigate trade disputes (Gathii, 2019). Notably, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt and
Tunisia are the only States to have been directly involved as parties in any of the 584 disputes brought
to the WTO since it was set up in 1995 (Miles, 2019). Some explanations for this dispute paralysis on
the part of African States are cost, lack of technical expertise, lack of effective trade policy
infrastructure, political reluctance, the rampant use of preferential trade arrangements that derogate
from general WTO principles, limited market share and diversity, lack of confidence in WTO
institutions, doubts over the quality and reach of the DSB’s rulings and the lack of capacity to retaliate
(Apecu, 2013, 52–53; Alavi, 2007, 27-29; Van der Borght, 2011). Some of these factors perhaps also
explain why none of the AfCFTA Member States has sued another before any of the regional courts
(Simo, 2019). A further explanation for the dearth of intra-African adjudication is that African States
are historically predisposed to political solutions as opposed to litigation (Maluwa, 1989, 308;
Mbengue, 2014, 169-170; Akinkugbe, 2019b).
11 The historical reality notwithstanding, one should not downplay the importance of a functional
AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism. Indeed, recent events such as unilateral border closures by
Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria, and some other African States, raise concerns and provide a glimpse
of potential flashpoints that may be judicialized in the future (Signé and van der VenMonday, 2019;
Pete, 2020). Moreover, given the slow pace of trade rules negotiations, a robust dispute settlement
mechanism can help to develop and adapt the subsisting rules to emerging situations and fill gaps that
may otherwise undermine the effectiveness of the trading system (Apecu, 2013, 52). It is such concerns
that, at least in theory, make the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism a critical aspect of the
AfCFTA establishment. It is worth highlighting that in the majority of investment arbitration disputes,
African State parties have been Respondents, yet that has not stopped them from contributing
meaningfully to the development of international investment law jurisprudence (Akinkugbe, 2019a).
AfCFTA, with its dispute settlement mechanism, is the culmination, so far, of a six-decade march
towards rules-based African economic integration. Whether the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism will change the culture of African States towards dispute resolution is a totally different
question, which only time will tell.

4
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C. Procedural Steps or Issues under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African
Continental Free Trade Area
12 The AfCFTA-DSM Protocol offers three broad dispute resolution options. These are: adjudication
(See, generally, Arts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 AfCFTA-DSM
Protocol), mediation (Art 8 AfCFTA-DSAM Protocol) (mediation is used as a collective reference to
mediation, good offices and conciliation, the three diplomatic methods of dispute resolution jointly
contained in the AfCFTA), and arbitration (Art 27 AfCFTA-DSAM Protocol). However when a
dispute is submitted, especially for adjudication, State Parties undertake, to participate in consultations
in good faith to try to resolve the dispute amicably (Arts 6(1) and 7 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
Consultations provide an opportunity for State Parties to harness the benefit of the informality of the
deliberations in this phase. Although consultations also feature in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, their inclusion as a preliminary and mandatory step in the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism emphasizes the prioritization of amicable settlement over disputation. This feature aligns
with the historical disposition of Africa to trade dispute resolution. The Protocol specifies timelines
for consultations, and if the process fails, the matter can be referred by the DSB to a Panel for
adjudication (Art 7(4), (5), 6) and (9) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Irrespective of outcome, consultations
must be concluded within 60 days of the receipt of the request for consultations (Art 7(4–6) AfCFTADSM Protocol). This specification is welcome for the sake of expediency, as it makes it less convenient
for a defaulting State Party to use the process to clog the wheels of justice. Conversely, the 60-day
period also makes it less conducive for a party to rush into the more adversarial process of
adjudication. Further flexibility in the protocol allows the DSB to establish a panel in a shorter
timeframe of 20 days in cases of urgency, for example if the dispute involves perishable goods (Art
7(9) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
1. Panel Adjudication
13 Adjudication is the most formal of the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism options. It involves
the submission of a dispute to a DSB panel for the purpose of resolving that dispute. The AfCFTA
dispute settlement mechanism is reserved solely for disputes between State Parties (Art 20(1)
AfCFTA). Para 1(h) of the AfCFTA-DSM Protocol clearly stipulates that ‘Party to a dispute or
proceedings means a State Party to a dispute or proceedings’. The implication being that private
entities lack legal standing to institute proceedings, regardless of what justiciable grievances they may
have. A private entity’s grievance can only be submitted by its home State Party. Why the framers
opted for the WTO-style rather than their more flexible regional economic community options is not
clear, but this choice is certainly a cause for concern in view of the notorious apathy of African States
towards litigation (Simo, 2019). Gathii’s assertion is that this wholesale adoption of the dispute
settlement mechanism established by WTO rules is premised on the desire by some African States
and experts to make the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism as strong and successful as that of
the global trading system in order to ensure compliance with the AfCFTA commitments (Gathii,
2019). In doing so however, the framers seem to have lost sight of some African peculiarities – political
apathy and the role of private entities, for instance – that, perhaps, make any dispute settlement
mechanism that is wholly driven by State actors liable to flounder. While there is nothing inherently
wrong in the transplantation of dispute systems such as the WTO model, the success of such
transplants depends on the extent of the adaptation to the socio-political realities of the destination
® World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement [MPEPIL] (Stoll, 2014).

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3825805

14 The disinclination of African States towards adversarial dispute resolution, as well as trade
disputation with private entities, continues to be underlined by an increasing withdrawal of African
states from investor-state arbitration. Many African States have recently enacted national legislation
to insulate themselves from international disputes. An example is South Africa’s Promotion of
Investment Act, 2015. Section 15(5) provides that ‘The government may consent to international
arbitration in respect of investments covered by th[e] Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies. [...]. Such arbitration will be conducted between the Republic and the home state of the
applicable investor.’ In 2016, Namibia enacted the Namibia Investment Promotion Act, 2016. Section
28(4) provides that:
the jurisdiction over disputes relating to this Act lies exclusively with the courts of Namibia,
but the Minister and investor or investment, as required by the circumstances of the alleged
breach of rights or obligations, may, by written agreement, agree to arbitration in accordance
with the Arbitration Act, 1965 (Act No. 42 of 1965) in Namibia.
In 2017, Tanzania enacted, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act. Section
11(2) provides that ‘disputes arising from extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural
wealth and resources shall be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established in the United
Republic and in accordance with laws of Tanzania.’ They ‘shall not be a subject of proceedings in any
foreign court or tribunal.’ In 2018, Tanzania also terminated its bilateral investment treaty with the
Netherlands, citing the rigidity of the treaty as a reason (Habib, 2019). These developments reamplify
the deep-seated discontent of African States with formal dispute settlement systems (Akinkugbe,
2020a). Given this background, it is feared that the current mismatch between the chosen AfCFTA
dispute settlement mechanism and African States’ attitudes could have larger repercussions because,
as Regis Simo observes, the potential dormancy of the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism would
deprive the States Parties of the security and predictability of the African continental trading system.
15 AfCFTA disputes are heard before a panel constituted by the DSB, in consultation with the parties
to the dispute (Art 10 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). A DSB panel may consist of either three members –
in the case of a bilateral dispute – or five members – in the case of a multilateral dispute (Art 10(9)
AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Each of the dispute settlement mechanism options discussed here –
adjudication, conciliation, or arbitration – may be conducted in a bilateral or multilateral manner. Even
where a dispute commenced bilaterally, additional parties may join subject to the consent of the
original parties. This is a positive feature as it helps to prevent a multiplicity of actions. This uneven
composition ensures that there is no deadlock in a panel’s decision making. This provision is
complemented by Article 15(9) which stipulates that the panel shall produce a single report reflecting
the views of the majority of the panelists. This provision, taken literally, does not require that the
minority view(s), if any, be included in the report. We are of the view that it is better for the DSB, as
well as the Appellate Body, if convened, to have the benefit of the minority view, even though the
majority view is prevalent.
16 Article 15(8) provides some insights on what material the panel may consider in reaching its
findings on a dispute, ie in addition to the Agreement. It provides that the reports of the Panel shall
be based on information and evidence provided by the parties and any other person, ® experts, or
institution, in accordance with the protocol. Each party is entitled to make written submissions to
support its case (Art 15(3) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). It is not stated whether evidence is limited to ®
documentary evidence or may include oral evidence of persons other than experts. However since the
panel is to make assessments of fact, it is implicit that it can receive any form of evidence that can
enable it to make those assessments. The panel can, in any case, relying on its Article 11(3) powers,
6
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draw up terms of reference that prescribe how parties adduce evidence. The panel is empowered to
seek information and technical advice from any source that it deems appropriate and on any matter
that may be brought before it, after informing the relevant State Parties to the dispute (Art 16(1) and
(7) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). The panel must nevertheless be consciously guided by the need for
expediency in its proceedings. This is because the Agreement requires the panel to submit its findings
within five months from the date the panel is established. In urgent cases the report must be submitted
within one and a half months (Art 15(4) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). If a delay is unavoidable, this
timeframe may be extended to a maximum period of nine months at the request of the panel made to
the DSB.
17 The principal function of the panel is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the
Agreement. Decisions are ultimately made by the DSB, not the panel. The panel’s task is merely to
make findings and report to the DSB. It is based on these findings that the DSB makes
recommendations or rulings to the disputing Parties (Art 11 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). All claims,
findings and recommendations must be anchored on the AfCFTA Agreement (or one of its protocols
and annexes). Thus, the measure complained against can only attract an unfavourable DSB ruling or
recommendation if it is found to be inconsistent with some relevant provision(s) of the Agreement
(Arts 11 and 23 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
18 The adjudicatory process of AfCFTA is designed to engender thoroughness, participation,
transparency, a fair hearing, reconciliation, and substantive justice (Art 2 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
The DSB is obligated to constitute the panel in a manner that ensures a fair hearing (Art 10(4)–(5)
AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). At the conclusion of hearing, the panel is required to issue a draft report to
the parties, to which the parties may submit their comments and objections within a period set by the
panel (Art 18 (1)–(2) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). After this period, the panel issues an interim report to
the parties containing its findings and conclusions. The interim report may also be subject to
comments and reviews between the panel and the parties, before the final report is produced,
circulated, and forwarded to the DSB (Art 18 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
19 The rigorous approach continues even after the report is forwarded to the DSB. Parties can still
object to the report. A party may include in its objection newly discovered facts which by their nature
have a decisive influence on the decision (Art 19(2) AfCFTA DSM Protocol). The panel’s report is
reviewed by the DSB before it is adopted. Similar to Article 16(3) of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, the ‘parties are entitled to participate fully in the
consideration of the Panel Reports by the DSB, and their views shall be recorded’ (Art 19(3) AfCFTADSM Protocol). Adoption shall occur within 60 days of circulation unless the parties agree by
consensus not to adopt (Art 19(4) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Also, the DSB cannot adopt the report
if a party has notified the DSB of its intention to appeal. In that case the report shall not be considered
for adoption until the completion of the appeal (Art 19(4) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). An implication
of these provisions is that a party that is unsatisfied with the findings of the panel can get those findings
overturned, either by facilitating a consensus against the report, at the DSB level, or by filing an appeal
against the report. A party that has participated in the DSB consideration can still appeal, provided
that it notifies its intention to appeal before the panel report is adopted. Once the report has been
adopted, the decision of the DSB becomes final and the right of appeal abates (Art 6(5) AfCFTADSM Protocol).
20 Like the WTO regime (Guan, 2014, 79-82), Article 19(4) of the AfCFTA-DSM Protocol
incorporates ‘negative consensus’ in the adoption process. The provision stipulates that the DSB may
7
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by consensus refuse to adopt a panel report. It does not however specify what happens after a panel
report is rejected. Does the matter terminate there? Does the DSB remit the matter to the panel –
perhaps, for a fresh consideration – or constitute a new panel to rehear the matter? Do the parties, on
an ad-hoc basis, decide what happens next? African States missed an opportunity to go beyond the
WTO here. It would be an important step forward if this aspect of the dispute settlement system is
clarified further.
2. Appeals
21 The Appellate Body hears appeals against the findings and recommendations of a DSB Panel.
Unlike the panel, which is constituted on an ad-hoc basis, the Appellate Body is a standing body
consisting of seven persons each appointed by the DSB for a four-year term. Each person can only
be reappointed once. Only three persons hear a case (Art 20 (1)–(4) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
22 This is another context in which the WTO dispute settlement mechanism transplantation can
undermine the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism. One of the travails currently bedevilling the
WTO-DSB borders is the appointment of Appellate Body members (Article 17 WTO- Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2; ® Election of Appellate Body
Members: World Trade Organization (WTO)). The once vibrant WTO Appellate Body became dormant
in late 2019 because the tenure of its members expired, and the US vetoed the appointment of new
members (Creamer, 2019, 53). The AfCFTA’s similar provisions on appointment mean that the
Appellate Body may in the future find itself crippled if just one State decides to ensure that outcome
(This is the combined effect of Arts 5(3), 20(4), 5(2), (6) and 1(c) of the AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). In
terms of the African experience, it is a fact of recent memory that the SADC disbanded the SADC
Tribunal after the regional court held that the Zimbabwean government’s land seizures violated the
rule of law (Nathan, 2013, 22). The fact that most of the African regional courts with the initial
mandate to resolve trade disputes have evolved into the landscape of human rights, in some cases
without explicit treaty basis, also raises concern (Gathii, 2010, 245). Based on these lessons, a less
vulnerable appointment process for the Appellate Body members – perhaps, one that is based on a
specified majority, rather than on consensus – is more suitable.
23 Only parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report. Third parties may be heard if they
demonstrate substantial interest in the matter (Art 21(1) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Appeals must be
determined within a period of 60 days from the date of commencement. This may extend to a period
not exceeding 90 days, if the Appellate Body so requires (Arts 21(2) and 22(3) AfCFTA-DSM
Protocol). Appeals are limited only to issues of law covered in the panel report (Art 21(3) AfCFTADSM Protocol). The Appellate Body has the power to uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings
and conclusions of the panel (Art 22(6) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Unlike a panel report, which is
subject to significant back-and-forth between the parties and the panel and can be objected to before
the DSB, the Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the
parties (Art 22(9) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). The DSB may, however, by consensus, decide not to
adopt the Appellate Body report (Art 22(9) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).

8
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3. Compliance and Enforcement
24 Article 23 mandates that:
where the Panel or the AB concludes that a measure is inconsistent with the Agreement, it
shall recommend that the State Party concerned bring the measure into conformity with the
Agreement ... In addition, the Panel or the Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
State Party concerned could implement the recommendations (Art 23 AfCFTA-DSM
Protocol).
25 State Parties are obligated to comply voluntarily with DSB rulings and recommendations (Art 34(1)
AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). The protocol stipulates timelines for implementation, as well as a
mechanism for monitoring implementation (see, generally, Art 24 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol).
Compensation or retaliation, in the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations, are
prescribed as temporary measures available to the aggrieved party in the event that the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB are not implemented within a reasonable period of time
Article 25(1) and (3). Similar WTO principles suggest that the main objective of the complaining party
in exerting retaliatory measures is not to restore the balance of concessions, but rather to induce the
defending party to comply with its obligations (McGivern, 2002, 144; ® Arbitration on the Level of
Retaliation: Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization (WTO)). Article 25(4) prescribes an
avenue via which an aggrieved party may invoke retaliatory measures if the other party fails to comply
with the DSB recommendations. These countermeasures are meant to be proportionate to the
measure adopted by the other party (Art 25(5), (6) and (7) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Countermeasures
are also meant to be a last resort, when the defaulting party is unyielding to the terms of the treaty.
4. Mediation
26 Article 8 of the Dispute Settlement Protocol provides an avenue for State Parties to a dispute to
mediate. Like the consultations process, mediation is meant to foster amicable resolution of disputes
among State Parties. Such processes align well with traditional dispute resolution processes of various
pre-colonial African communities (Elias, 1956; Attah-Poku, 1998). The process in Article 8 differs
from consultations in two keyways. First, unlike consultations which must take place whenever a
dispute has been submitted to the DSB, mediation is entirely voluntary. A party to a dispute may opt
in or out at any time (Art 8(4) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Further, while consultations always precede
adjudication, mediation can run concurrently with panel proceedings, if the State Parties to the dispute
so agree Art 8(5) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Thus while the protocol specifies a time limit of 60 days
for consultations, no such restriction applies to mediation.
5. Arbitration
27 Parties to a dispute are at liberty to resort to arbitration (Art 27 AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). AfCFTA
recognizes the principle of party autonomy in arbitration (on ‘party autonomy’, see Livingstone, 2008).
Accordingly, the arbitration process is at the behest of the parties involved and is not controlled by
the DSB (Chazournes, 2005, 181). State Parties can choose their own forum and procedural rules. The
AfCFTA Agreement however governs the substance of the dispute.
28 Parties to a dispute who have agreed to arbitration cannot simultaneously refer the dispute to the
DSB (Art 27(2) AfCFTA-DSM Protocol). Again, this is a provision that accords importance to
arbitration commitments. Parties must notify the DSB of the decision to go to arbitration. Further,
9
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Article 27(6) of the Protocol stipulates that ‘in the event of a Party to a dispute refusing to cooperate,
the Complaining Party shall refer the matter to the DSB for determination.’ It seems that this provision
refers to non-cooperation with the arbitral process, rather than the award. This is because there is a
more specific provision that deals with enforcement of awards. If an unsuccessful party does not
cooperate with the award, the complaining party’s recourse is to the enforcement procedures in
Articles 24 and 25, rather than ‘refer the matter to the DSB for determination.’ Thus, it seems that
Article 27(6) is prescribed to cater for situations where a party acts in a manner that is likely to frustrate
the arbitration process, pre-award. The extent of what the DSB can do here is also vague. What does
‘determination’ mean? Does it mean that the DSB will consider the complaint of lack of cooperation
and, perhaps, make interlocutory orders directing the uncooperative party to cooperate with the
arbitration process? Can the DSB seize the matter from arbitration and instead constitute a panel to
resolve or determine the substantive ‘matter’ in the same manner as a dispute originally referred to the
DSB? This seems implausible because it contravenes the principle of party autonomy. There is need
for clarity here. Once an award has been issued it becomes binding on the parties and shall be notified
to the DSB for enforcement (Chazournes, 2005, 188). The DSB enforces an arbitration award in the
same manner as a DSB Panel or Appellate Body ruling/recommendation (Art 27(7) AfCFTA-DSM
Protocol).
29 The arbitration mechanism of Article 25 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes is rarely used. However, in response to deadlock in the Appellate Body, a
group of WTO members developed the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (‘MPIA’)
as a temporary solution to preserve the WTO’s Appellate function for disputes among MPIA
participants. As at the time of writing this entry, Benin is the only African state that has joined the ad
hoc MPIA.

D. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free Trade Area and its
relationship with other regional Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
30 While the establishment of a rules-based continental trade system has been a protracted affair,
African countries have proven more adept at forming regional trade ties. While formal intra-Africa
trade with the African continent trails in comparison to trade with Western States, informal trade
within the regional economic communities in Africa is a key feature. (Gathii, 2011, 11; Chirisa, 2014,
134)
31 There are no fewer than eight AU recognized regional economic communities on the continent,
with some countries belonging to more than one (See UNECA). Examples include COMESA, SADC,
→ East African Community (EAC) [MPEPIL] (Kaahwa, 2013), the Economic Community of West
African States (‘ECOWAS’) and the → Economic Community of Central African States [MPEPIL]
(Savadogo, 2018) (‘ECCAS’). Historically, the regional economic communities (‘REC’s) were regarded
as the building blocks that would morph into an AEC, with conscious recognition of the fact that
RECs were at different stages of integration. See Oppong, 2010). Each REC has a dispute settlement
mechanism of its own, with some varying characteristics (See: Art 2 COMESA Treaty – establishing
the → Court of Justice of the West African Economic and Monetary Union; Arts 23 and 27 EAC Treaty –
establishing and conferring jurisdiction on the East African Court of Justice; Art 32 SADC Treaty –
establishing the → Southern African Development Community Tribunal; Art 16 of the ECCAS Treaty –
10
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establishing the Court of Justice for the Community; and Art 76 ECOWAS Treaty – establishing the
→ Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Because the RECs and
AfCFTA pursue largely similar objectives – trade liberalization and economic integration – a dispute
arising between member States of the same region can provide avenues for forum shopping between
the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism and an REC dispute settlement mechanism (Pauwelyn,
2004, 240).
32 The AfCFTA will protect the existing acquis of the regional economic communities (See Arts 5(b),
(l), 8(2) and 18(2) AfCFTA). Article 19(1) AfCFTA attempts to address such issues by providing that
in the event of any conflict and inconsistency between the Agreement and any regional agreement, the
Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the specific inconsistency. This provision settles the general
question as to which rules system prevails in the event of a conflict or inconsistency. However, as an
exception, State Parties that are members of RECs which have attained among themselves ‘higher
levels of regional integration’ than under AfCFTA shall maintain such levels among themselves (Art
20(2) AfCFTA). What implications could this exception have on the interaction between the AfCFTA
and RECs’ dispute settlement mechanisms? Let us consider, for example, the fact that some of the
RECs dispute settlement mechanisms allow private disputation (see Art 26 COMESA Treaty. See Arts
27, 28 and 29 EAC Treaty – prescribing that disputes may be referred by the Partner States, the
Secretary-General, legal and natural persons). Some of the RECs also allow litigation before national
courts), a feature that seems inconsistent with the AfCFTA position. The general effect of Article
19(1) would be to override that position and, therefore, strip private entities of standing in trade
matters. Yet, Article 19(2) would allow private entities in some States to continue to enjoy standing if
their RECs are deemed to have attained higher integration than the AfCFTA. Not only does this create
an asymmetry on access to justice within the AfCFTA, but it also ignores one important consideration:
the fact that an REC has attained a higher level of integration does not necessarily mean that its dispute
settlement mechanism is more functional than that of AfCFTA. It does not mean that the REC dispute
settlement mechanism is more amenable to actualizing the objectives of AfCFTA or the relevant RTA.
There is little to suggest that the RECs’ dispute settlement mechanisms – even for the relatively more
active – have done or can do much to assert regional integration.
33 The lack of uniformity in dispute settlement ensuing from this deference to some REC dispute
settlement mechanisms could undermine the core objectives of AfCFTA. As Oppong commenting
on uniformity in the integration of the AEC through dispute resolution, puts it:
A foundation for instability is laid where uneven obligations, in terms of the enforcement and
enforceability of community law, are imposed on member states. It is difficult to conceive of
a stable and effective economic community where community law is not uniformly applicable
within and enforceable against member states. Indeed, the very essence of integration is
defeated; “uniformity in the meaning of law is part of the constitutional glue that holds the
Community together (Oppong, 2010, 100).
34 The onus must rest on the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism to strive towards uniform
efficiency in dispute settlement, to disincentivize forum shopping, as well as to facilitate compliance,
stability and rapid integration across the board.
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E. Imagining an Effective Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the African Continental Free
Trade Area
35 The factors that most threaten to undermine the efficacy of the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism are the uncertain political will of State Parties and the complete alienation of private actors.
The only way that the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism can better the history of its forerunners
is for the State Parties to exhibit the political will for its success. State Parties must be willing to submit
to the system when disputes arise and accept decisions when they go against them. State Parties must
willingly avoid the tendency to gravitate towards colonial cum linguistic affiliations that have derailed
past continental aspirations (Akinkugbe, 2021, forthcoming). Without these reinforced commitments,
the security and predictability that the dispute settlement mechanism is supposed to provide to the
trading system will be eroded.
36 Uncertainty, non-compliance, non-transparency and a lack of remedies will undermine the benefits
to be gained from any trade agreement (Erasmus, 2011, 18–19). Private entities are the most likely to
be negatively affected. Investors will also shy away from markets where they do not enjoy the
protection of the law and cannot enforce their rights (Erasmus, 2011). Individuals have an important
role to play in economic integration, not least in ensuring the implementation of community laws
(Oppong, 2010). It is important to remember that it is private entities that will engage in the actual
trade in goods, services, and investments across the continent; and it is the interaction of those private
parties that will invariably give rise to commercial or business disputes (Onyema, 2019, 1). They bear
the burdens of government policies and measures in the states that they operate in and have certainly
shown greater appetite to challenge digressions (See Polytol Paints & Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd v
The Republic of Mauritius, 2012, where a private entity successfully sued a State party before the
COMESA Court of Justice to enforce trade aspects of the COMESA Treaty. See also British American
Tobacco Uganda Limited v Attorney-General of Uganda, 2019, where the East African Court of Justice held
that an additional excise duty that Uganda imposed on cigarettes imported into East Africa constituted
a violation of the EAC Common Market Protocol). The jurisdiction of the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism should be expanded to accommodate private enforcement, as is the case in some of the
RECs. One way to manage the inflow of disputes to the DSB is to empower the secretariat to receive
and review complaints from private entities directly – via electronic means – conduct preliminary
investigations, if necessary, to determine whether to begin a process of consultations or refer the
complaint to a DSB Panel (Olatunji, 2019). This process will enable the secretariat to better monitor
compliance with the AfCFTA, advance only those complaints that present substantial issues, while
also giving private stakeholders the opportunity to play a major part in the dispute settlement process
(Olatunji, 2019; See also Oppong’s earlier suggestion, with regard to the AU Court of Justice, that
private individuals be allowed to litigate before the court, with the special leave of the court and after
exhausting local remedies (Oppong, 2010, 101).
37 Even when private entities are not suing States, in their official capacities or to enforce AfCFTA
obligations, they may also have cause for commercial disputes from trading with other private entities
across borders. When such disputes arise, resort to national courts faces various challenges, including
language barriers, multiplicity of legal systems, bureaucratic bottlenecks and time and cost constraints
(Onyema, 2019). There is need for a universally responsive AfCFTA-centric legal regime and dispute
mechanism to override such challenges. As an alternative to national courts and national legal orders,
Onyema advocates the harmonization of economic laws and the installation of a supranational dispute
settlement mechanism – Regional Arbitration Centers – that is competent to arbitrate disputes arising
from intra-African commercial transactions and efficiently enforce awards emanating therefrom
12
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(through a one-stop African Commercial Court with a mandate to enforce Regional Arbitration
Centers’ awards anywhere in the free trade area) (Onyema, 2019, 1). For this system to work, State
Parties must be willing to cede some of their sovereignty to a supranational economic law and
arbitration system with powers of enforcement, to boost the confidence of private stakeholders
operating in the AfCFTA (Onyema, 2019, 467 ; Onyema points to a similar system that is already in
place in the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (‘OHADA’) axis, covering
17 African countries; ® Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) of the Organization for the
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA)).
38 Unless AfCFTA member States can underline their unreserved commitment to the entire AfCFTA
dispute settlement mechanism, it is pertinent that a commercial arbitration system, as envisaged by
Onyema, is isolated from the States-only dispute settlement mechanism. Separation can help to
prevent a similar fate as that of the SADC Tribunal which, initially empowered to hear disputes
between SADC member States as well as private persons against the States, was crippled after its first
landmark decisions in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2008). The result of
that decision was the amputation of its competence to be seized by individuals and eventual descent
into dormancy (Simo, 2019). In the context of the African experience, a reimagined AfCFTA dispute
settlement mechanism that focuses on the settlement of commercial disputes between private entities,
perhaps stands a better chance of survival and optimal utilization. This leaves the State Parties to
enjoy, as they choose, their exclusive right to patronize the more reconciliatory dispute settlement
techniques already in place, and political solutions to address their concerns under the present
AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism model.
39 Finally, there is need to review the remedies that the AfCFTA provides. Presently, compensation
and retaliation are the ultimate remedies for the violation of AfCFTA obligations (Art 25 AfCFTADSM Protocol). Compensation can be faulted for potentially decreasing overall compliance with DSB
rulings, especially as the remedy is merely voluntary (Mercurio, 2009a, 327). The viability of retaliation
has been questioned (Mercurio, 2009b, 400) and is identified as one of the reasons why African
countries do not use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Mosoti, 2006, highlighting that this
remedy is skewed against African countries – which lack the capacity to retaliate against their wealthier
counterparts – and therefore not effectively usable if the need arises). The wholesale adoption of this
remedy into the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism is therefore questionable given that the same
factors that make retaliation unattractive to the weaker WTO member States also exist among African
States where, admittedly, not “all fingers” are equal. There is, in my view, a need to incorporate
alternative remedies – group retaliation and widespread loss of privilege for nonconformists for
instance – in order to entrench the security and certainty that AfCFTA needs. These measures should
however only be applied in extreme cases.
F. Conclusion
40 This entry analyzes the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism historically and comparatively.
Historically, the entry locates the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism in the context of other
WTO-styled dispute mechanisms in Africa, as well as the near inactivity of trade-related disputes from
the dockets of regional economic community courts. Based on this transplantation and a dearth of
trade-related disputes, the entry highlights the challenges that the AfCFTA dispute settlement
mechanism may confront –apathy and a formal trade-related dispute phobia by the AfCFTA Member
States in utilizing the regime. The entry also analyzes the procedural steps for initiating disputes under
13
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the AfCFTA dispute settlement mechanism and where necessary, briefly assesses the potential areas
of improvement that may better position the dispute settlement mechanism to facilitate the overall
objectives of the AfCFTA.
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